Abstract: This paper partially extends the f -core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) for continuum economies with widespread externalitiesi.e., those over which each individual has negligible control. Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free disposal of divisible goods nor monotone preferences are assumed. Instead, a slightly strengthened form of local non-satiation suffices.
Introduction
The earlier paper by Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) (henceforth referred to as HKW) presented a particular model of an economy with a continuum of individual agents and widespread externalities. The externalities were assumed to result directly from trading activities. That paper considered the "f -core" consisting of allocations that could not be blocked or improved by any finite coalition outside a null set. The main result (Theorem 1) concerned the equivalence of the f -core and the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations.
The main purpose of this note is to extend this equivalence result to a broader class of economic environments, as described in Section 2. This class includes those considered in Kaneko and Wooders (1994) and in Hammond (1995 Hammond ( , 1998 ) -see also the work cited in Section 7 of Khan, Rath and Sun (1997) . The widespread externalities need not result directly from trading activities. In addition, rather than fixed endowments, individuals will be assumed to have feasible sets of net trades that may allow for domestic production.
Moreover, these feasible sets may not allow free disposal even of divisible goods, and preferences are required only to satisfy a slightly strengthened form of local non-satiation instead of monotonicity.
The cost of these generalizations will be a somewhat weaker result, showing only that any f -core allocation must be a compensated Nash-Walrasian equilibrium, as defined in Section 3. That is, the individuals' choices of net trade vectors must be a compensated Walrasian equilibrium in the sense of Khan and Yamazaki (1981) , while their choices of externalities must be a Nash equilibrium. The final transition to a Nash-Walrasian equilibrium is then possible under extra assumptions such as those presented in HKW, or in Yamazaki (1978 Yamazaki ( , 1981 , Hammond (1993) , or Coles and Hammond (1995) .
Section 4 adapts Hildenbrand's (1982) proof of the classical core equivalence theorem, which is based upon Aumann's (1964) original ingenious argument. In fact, unlike the classical theorem or the argument used in HKW, the proof here is more elementary because it does not rely on Lyapunov's theorem concerning the convexity of the range of an nvalued non-atomic measure, even in the case when n = 1. Nor does it use the important implication due to Richter (1963) that the integral of a correspondence w.r.t. a non-atomic measure is a convex set (see Hildenbrand (1974) , Theorem 3, p. 62).
The final Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
A Continuum Economy with Widespread Externalities
Throughout the paper the setting will be an economy with a continuum of agents, as originally formulated by Aumann (1964 Aumann ( , 1966 . See also Hildenbrand (1974 Of course, individuals typically have preferences that extend to the set of all triples (x a , e a , e) satisfying (x a , e a ) ∈ F a (e). These preferences are relevant for any efficiency or other welfare properties. The preferences for widespread externalities e, however, have no effect on the equilibrium or f -core allocations considered in this paper.
T is the conditionally feasible set of net trade vectors. Note that endowments of traded goods have been netted out. Nor are such endowments necessarily fixed vectors because agents may be endowed with production possibility sets instead, as in Rader (1964) .
In HKW we considered a special case of the model presented here. We assumed that E = T , so externalities were equivalent to net trade vectors. Furthermore, T was partitioned into the two sets D of divisible goods and I of indivisible goods. Also, for each agent a ∈ A, the conditionally feasible set was assumed to be independent of e, and given by
where ω a denotes agent a's fixed endowment vector, and Z I + is the set of possible nonnegative vectors of indivisible goods, with integer coordinates.
Let Q ⊂ denote the set of rational numbers. Let Q T denote the subset of T whose members are vectors with all their coordinates in Q. The conditional feasible set F ⊂ T × E and strict preference relation on F are said to be locally non-satiated in rational net trade vectors if, for any (x, e) ∈ F and any neighbourhood N of x in T , there exist x ∈ N ∩ Q T and e ∈ E such that (x , e ) ∈ F with (x , e ) (x, e). The same pair F and on F are said to be continuously non-satiated in rational net trade vectors if, for every pair (x, e), (x , e ) ∈ F with (x , e ) (x, e) or (x , e ) = (x, e) and for every
with (x , e ) (x, e).
Continuous non-satiation in rational net trade vectors, as defined above, trivially implies local non-satiation in rational net trade vectors. Also, the two conditions are logically equivalent when the relation is transitive, or even if it is intransitive but instead satisfies a standard continuity condition on T . Furthermore, both conditions are satisfied whenever preferences for traded goods satisfy any of the usual monotonicity conditions. None of these properties is assumed here, however, so the second stronger assumption is required for the main theorem.
A feasible allocation is a measurable mapping (x, e) : 
Nash-Walrasian Equilibrium Allocations and the f -Core
Say that the finite coalition S ⊂ A can improve the feasible allocation (x,ê) if, for all a ∈ S, there exists an alternative x a ∈ P a (x a ,ê a ;ê) such that a∈S x a = 0. Note that any finite coalition has measure zero, so its choice of externalities leavesê essentially unaffected.
The feasible allocation (x,ê) is said to be in the f -core iff there is a full set of agents
after excluding a null set of agents if necessary, it must be impossible to form any improving or blocking finite coalition S.
It seems evident that finite coalitions lack the power to improve any allocation in the f -core. But do they also really have the power to improve any allocation outside the fcore? Instead of answering this question directly, I offer the following apparently stronger definition of "discernible improvements," which leads to an apparently larger set of "weak"
f -core allocations.
Specifically, say that the finite family of m non-null measurable sets S k ∈ A (k = 1, 2, . . . , m) (with µ(S k ) > 0, and not necessarily disjoint), can discernibly improve the feasible allocation (x,ê) if there exist corresponding natural numbers n k such that every finite coalition made up of exactly n k agents from each set S k in the finite family, but no other agents, can improve this allocation. The feasible allocation (x,ê) is said to be in the weak f -core iff no finite family of measurable sets can discernibly improve the allocation.
Evidently, if some finite family S k (k = 1, 2, . . . , m) can discernibly improve an allocation, then any full set of agents A 1 must include improving finite coalitions with an appropriate number of members selected from each of the non-null sets A 1 ∩ S k . So the f -core is a subset of the weak f -core.
Because neither free disposal of traded goods nor monotonicity of preferences has been assumed, any equilibrium price vector p ∈ T could have some negative components. Accordingly, say that any feasible allocation (x,ê) and price vector p = 0 together constitute a Nash-Walrasian equilibrium if, a.e. in A, both px a = 0 and also any x a ∈ P a (x a ,ê a ;ê)
satisfies p x a > 0. This is a Walrasian equilibrium insofar as almost all agents choose private good net trade vectors in order to maximize preferences subject to their budget constraints.
It is a Nash equilibrium insofar as almost all agents choose externalities and private goods simultaneously in order to maximize preferences given the widespread externalities chosen by almost everybody else. Because of the assumption that there is a continuum of agents, these externalities are described byê up to an irrelevant null set of agents. Moreover, no individual agent has the power to changeê. Finally, note that in Nash-Walrasian equilibrium only traded goods in the set T are rationed by price; each agent is free to choose any combination e of externality creating activities in the space E at will, subject only to individual feasibility.
Finally, say that the feasible allocation (x,ê) and price vector p = 0 together constitute a compensated Nash-Walrasian equilibrium if, a.e. in A, both px a = 0 and also any x a in the closure of P a (x a ,ê a ;ê) satisfies p x a ≥ 0. This is an obvious adaptation of the standard concept of compensated Walrasian equilibrium (or quasi-equilibrium).
Suppose that each agent a ∈ A has a closed convex conditional feasible set F a T (ê) and a conditional strict preference relation
Suppose too that preferences are continuously non-satiated in rational vectors, and so locally non-satiated a fortiori. Then a well known sufficient condition for the compensated NashWalrasian equilibrium (x,ê, p) to be a (full) Nash-Walrasian equilibrium is that almost every agent a ∈ A has a cheaper point x a ∈ F a T (ê) with p x a < 0. Sufficient conditions for individuals to have such cheaper points are discussed in Hammond (1993) . So are somewhat weaker hypotheses than convexity of F a T (ê) under which, in an economy without externalities, a compensated Walrasian equilibrium is still a Walrasian equilibrium. Where these hypotheses are satisfied, there is exact equivalence between the f -core and the set of Nash-Walrasian (or Walrasian) equilibrium allocations.
f -Core Equivalence
A standard rather easy proof shows that any Nash-Walrasian equilibrium allocation is in the f -core. Conversely:
Weak Equivalence Theorem. Suppose that preferences are continuously non-satiated w.r.t. rational vectors. For any allocation (x,ê) in the weak f -core, there exists a price vector p = 0 such that (x,ê, p) is a compensated Nash-Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof: Let (x,ê) be any feasible allocation, not necessarily in the weak f -core. Then, following the beginning of Aumann's (1964, p. 45 ) and Hildenbrand's (1982, pp. 843-4) proof of core equivalence, for every t ∈ Q T , define the set
By our earlier assumption, the setÂ(t) must be measurable. Then let
Because Q T is countable, the set A is also measurable and satisfies µ(A ) = µ(A) = 1.
Finally, define the convex hull
Suppose that 0 ∈ K. Then there exist m agents a k ∈ A with conditionally preferred rational net trade vectors r k t k = 0. These equations combine to give a single matrix equation of the form r T = e 0 , where T is the (1 + #T ) × m matrix whose kth column has 1 in the first row followed by the vector t k , whereas e 0 is the unit vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ × T . This matrix equation can be solved by elementary row operations. Because each vector t k ∈ Q T has rational co-ordinates, the result will be a row vector r of non-negative convex weights which are rational numbers r k ∈ Q + . So there exist natural numbers n k (k = 1, . . . , m) such that m k=1 n k t k = 0. Because a k ∈ A , there is no t ∈ Q T such that a k ∈Â(t) and µ(Â(t)) = 0. Because
m).
Now define S as any finite coalition consisting of n k members from each of the m setŝ
Furthermore, for all a ∈ S, one has x a ∈ P a (x a ,ê a ;ê). This shows that the finite familyÂ(t k ) (k = 1 to m) can discernibly improve the allocation (x,ê).
Therefore (x,ê) is not in the weak f -core.
On the other hand, if (x,ê) does belong to the weak f -core, the preceding three paragraphs have shown that 0 ∈ K. Because K is convex, the separating hyperplane theorem then implies that there must exist p = 0 for which p t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ K.
Consider any a ∈ A and any x in the closure of P a (x a ,ê a ;ê). Then continuous nonsatiation in rational net trade vectors implies that there must exist an infinite sequence
so p x ≥ 0 in the limit.
Next, given any a ∈ A , the assumption of local non-satiation in rational net trade vectors implies the existence of an infinite sequence ( for all a ∈ A , it follows that px a = 0 a.e. in A , and so a.e. in A.
The results of the last two paragraphs confirm that (x,ê, p) is a compensated NashWalrasian equilibrium.
Concluding Remarks
As discussed in Section 3, the main result of Section 4 is not in itself a full equivalence theorem for the f -core. Like the usual equivalence theorem for the core, however, there will be full equivalence whenever a compensated Nash-Walrasian equilibrium is also an ordinary Nash-Walrasian equilibrium.
One limitation of the paper is the absence of any existence result such as those discussed by Khan, Rath and Sun (1997) or, if mixed strategies are allowed, by Balder (1996) , as well as in earlier work cited in those articles. It remains to be seen how far such existence results extend to economies with private traded goods and widespread externalities.
